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the MC model, to evaluate in￿ation targeting in the United States. Various
interest rate rules are tried with differing weights on in￿ation and output,
and various optimal control problems are solved using differing weights on
in￿ation and output targets. Price-level targeting is also considered. The
resultsshowthat1)thereareoutputcoststoin￿ationtargeting, especiallyfor
price shocks, 2) price-level targeting is dominated by in￿ation targeting, 3)
the estimated interest rate rule of the Fed (in Table 4) is consistent with the
Fed placing equal weights on in￿ation and unemployment in a loss function,
4)theestimatedinterestrateruledoesafairlygoodjobatloweringvariability,
and5)considerableeconomicvariabilityisleftaftertheFedhasdoneitsbest.
Overall, the results suggest that the Fed should continue to behave as it has
in the past.
1 Introduction
There has been much discussion in the recent literature on whether in￿ation tar-
geting (IT) by a monetary authority is a good idea. One approach is to look at
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fairmodel.econ.yale.edu. I am indebted to William Brainard and William Nordhaus for helpful
comments.performances of IT versus non IT countries. Using this approach, Ball and Sheri-
dan (2005) ￿nd no evidence that IT improves a country’s performance. There are,
however, a number of endogeneity problems associated with this approach, as the
authors are aware, and it is not clear what to make of the results. In comparisons
across countries it is hard to hold other things constant, especially initial condi-
tions. In addition, a country that is not formally an IT country may behave roughly
like one, and a country that is formally an IT country may behave somewhat more
￿exibly.
An alternative approach is to examine how an IT policy performs relative to
other types of monetary policies in an economic model. Different rules can be
examined, or formal optimal control problems can be solved. This is the approach
taken in this paper. The model used is a version of the multicountry (MC) macroe-
conometric model in Fair (2004). The MC model is quite different from the macro
model that is primarily used in the current literature, namely the ￿New Keynesian￿
(NK) model, and some justi￿cation is needed for using a different model. The
NK and MC models are brie￿y compared in Section 2. Section 3 then examines




22 The NK and MC Models
2.1 NK Model
Goodfriend and King (1997) lay out what they call the ￿New Neoclassical Synthe-
sis,￿ whichisrepresentedbytheNKmodel. Thefourfeaturesofthissynthesisare:
1) intertemporal optimization, 2) rational expectations, 3) imperfect competition,
and 4) costly price adjustment. The NK model plays a prominent role in Clarida,
Gal￿, and Gertler (1999) in their review of recent research in monetary policy, as
it does in Woodford (2003). Virtually all the papers in Taylor (1999a) use some
version of this model. Ireland (2004c, p. 923) states that ￿The development of
the forward-looking, microfounded New Keynesian model stands, in the eyes of
many observers, as one of the past decade’s most exciting and signi￿cant achieve-
ments in macroeconomics.￿ 1 Woodford (2006, p. 17) suggests that NK models
have ￿suf￿cient claim to quantitative realism to be of interest to policy-making
institutions.￿
In the NK model an in￿nitely lived, representative household maximizes the
discounted value of expected future utility. An intertemporal optimality condition
relates current consumption to expected future consumption and the real inter-
1OtherrecentexamplesoftheuseofthebasicNKmodelareAmatoandLaubach(2004),AndrØs,
L￿pez-Salido, and Nelson (2005), Belaygorod and Dueker (2005), Benigno (2004), Bouakez,
Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2005), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005), Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2001), Coenen and Wieland (2005), Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005), Giannoni and Woodford (2005), Iacoviello (2005), Ireland (2004a), G￿rkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2005), Keen (2004), Kim and Henderson (2005), King and Wolman (2004),
Ludec and Sill (2004), Leith and Malley (2005), Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003), Levin
and Williams (2003), LindØ (2005), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Pappa (2004), Rabanal and
Rubio-Ram￿rez (2005), Ravenna and Walsh (2006), Rudebusch (2005), Steinsson (2003), and Yun
(2005).
3est rate. Equating consumption to output yields an aggregate demand equation
in which current output depends on expected future output and the real interest
rate. The price equation, which has come to be called the ￿new-Keynesian Phillips
curve,￿ is a forward-looking Phillips curve in which current in￿ation depends on
expected future in￿ation and an output gap. It is derived from the optimizing be-
havior of monopolistically competitive ￿rms, where ￿rms change prices randomly
as discussed in Calvo (1983) or face some kind of adjustment costs. 2 An interest
rate rule is then sometimes added as a third equation in which the nominal interest
rate depends on in￿ation and the output gap.
Data on output (usually real GDP), in￿ation (usually the percentage change in
the GDP de￿ator), and the federal funds rate or the three-month Treasury bill rate
aretypicallyusedforthemodel. Sometimesdataonafewothervariablesareused,
depending on the setup. In particular, the labor income share is sometimes used
in the price equation in place of the output gap, as in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) and
Sbordone(2002), ifthepriceequationisbeinganalyzedseparately. Sometimesall
the parameters are calibrated and sometimes some parameters are calibrated and
some are estimated. Estimation includes maximum likelihood and matching the
model’s impulse responses to those of an estimated VAR. This work is all done
under the assumption of rational expectations. The parameters that are calibrated
or estimated are usually the structural parameters of the theoretical model, and so
2Recent studies dealing with the New Keynesian Phillips curve but not the entire NK model are
Batini, Jackson, and Nickell (2005), Gal￿, Gertler, and L￿pez-Salido (2005), which is a defense of
the earlier widely cited Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) paper, Kurmann (2005), Mankiw and Reis (2002),
who propose an alternative price equation, Mavroeidis (2005), Nessen and Vestin (2005), Rudd
and Whelan (2005), Sahuc (2005), and Sbordone (2005), which is a defense of the earlier widely
cited Sbordone (2002) paper.
4this analysis is not subject to the Lucas (1976) critique.
2.2 MC Model
ThetheoreticalmodeluponwhichtheMCmodelisbasedwas￿rstpresentedinFair
(1974a). An easier-to-read presentation is in Fair (1984). The following is a brief
outline of the model. It has two of the four features of the New Neoclassical Syn-
thesis, namelyintertemporaloptimizationandimperfectcompetition. Households
maximizeexpectedfutureutilityand￿rmsmaximizeexpectedfutureafter-taxcash
￿ow. The horizons for the maximization problems are ￿nite. The choice variables
for a household are consumption, leisure, and money holdings. The main choice
variables for a ￿rm are its price, wage rate, production, and investment. Expecta-
tionsoffuturevaluesbyhouseholdsand￿rmsarebasedoncurrentandpastvalues;
they are not assumed to be rational. Disequilibrium is allowed for, and it takes the
form of ￿rms telling households the maximum amount of labor they will hire in
the period and of actual sales differing from expected sales.
A household takes as given its initial values of money and bonds and the
current values of the price, wage rate, interest rate, personal income tax rate,
transfer payments, and the labor constraint from ￿rms. It forms expectations of
the future values of these variables and solves it optimization problem given a
terminal condition on the value of its money plus bonds.
A ￿rm faces a putty-clay technology. Adjustment costs are postulated for
changesinlaborandthecapitalstock. Firmssetpricesandwagesinamonopolistic
competitive setting. The demand for a ￿rm’s product depends on its price relative
5to the prices of the other ￿rms. A ￿rm expects that other ￿rms’ prices are affected
by the price that it sets. In other words, a ￿rm expects that other ￿rms will raise
(lower) their prices if the ￿rm raises (lowers) its own price. Similarly, the supply
of labor to a ￿rm depends on its wage rate relative to the wage rates of the other
￿rms, and a ￿rm expects that other ￿rms’ wage rates are affected by the wage rate
that it sets.3
A ￿rm takes as given all the initial values, including the initial values of other
￿rms’ prices and wage rates and the current values of the interest rate and the
pro￿t tax rate. It forms expectations of the relevant future values, where again
its expectations of other ￿rms’ prices and wage rates depend on its own behavior,
and solves its optimization problem. It chooses its price, wage rate, amount of
each type of machine to purchase, and production. Given its price and wage rate
decisions, a ￿rm has an expectation of its sales and of the amount of labor that will
be supplied to it. If actual sales turn out to be different from expected, this results
in an unexpected change in inventories. If actual labor supply exceeds expected
labor supply, the ￿rm is assumed to hire only the expected amount. In fact, the
model is set up so that ￿rms communicate to households the amount of labor they
arewillingtohire(namely,the￿rms’expectedamounts),andhouseholdsoptimize
under this constraint, as noted above.
Regardingtheexpectationsofhouseholdsand￿rmsinthetheoreticalmodel,for
anumberofvariablesequationsarepostulatedspecifyinghowtheexpectationsare
3No adjustment costs are postulated for price changes and wage rate changes, and all ￿rms
can change their prices and wage rates each period. This is contrary to the fourth feature of the
NewNeoclassicalSynthesismentionedabove, namelycostlypriceadjustment. Thisassumptionof
costlypriceadjustmentis,ofcourse,controversial,anditisnotnecessarilyadesirablefeatureofthe
synthesis. Bils and Klenow (2004) is a recent study casting doubt on the sticky price assumption.
6formed. FortheoverallmodelinFair(1974a)itisalsospeci￿edthathouseholdsand
￿rms estimate the parameters of these equations based on past data. In this sense
the expectations are sophisticated. The key point about expectations, however, is
that they are not speci￿ed to be rational or converge to being rational. Because
expectations are not rational, disequilibrium can occur, which drives many of the
properties of the model. Households and ￿rms never learn the true model; they
grope around in a complex world, never quite understanding everything.
Government ￿scal policy decisions are exogenous. The government chooses
the two tax rates, transfer payments, the amount of goods to purchase, and the
amount of labor to hire. On the monetary policy side, an interest rate rule is
postulated in which the interest rate depends on in￿ation and unemployment. Un-
employmentinthemodelisthedifferencebetweenthelaborthathouseholdswould
supplyifthelaborconstraintwerenotbindingandtheamounttheyactuallysupply
taking into account the labor constraint in their optimizing problem.
All￿owsoffundsandbalancesheetconstraintsareaccountedforinthemodel.
Onesector’ssavingissomeothersector’sdissaving. Onesector’s￿nancialliability
is some other sector’s ￿nancial asset.
The model in Fair (1974a) was a closed-economy model, but a two-country
model was introduced in Fair (1984). Again, all ￿ows of funds and balance sheet
constraints among the sectors of the countries are accounted for. The choice of
a household now includes how much to purchase of the foreign good, which is
affected by the price of the foreign good relative to the price of the home good.
The exchange rate is determined by a reaction function of one of the country’s
monetary authorities.
7The model is solved by numerical techniques, given chosen parameter values
and initial conditions. In a model in which disequilibrium is possible, the order
of transactions matters, and the order chosen is 1) the government, 2) ￿rms, and
then 3) households. Transactions take place after households have optimized.
Because ￿rms don’t have complete knowledge of the model, their price and wage
settingbehaviormayresultinsalesdifferingfromexpectedsalesandlabordemand
differing from the unconstrained labor supply. The numerical work consists of
running various experiments for the individual optimization problems and then
running experiments using the entire model. The experiments are designed to
explore the properties of the theoretical model.
Returning to the expectational assumptions used in the model, Mankiw and
Reis (2002, 2006) in recent work have modi￿ed the standard NK model by adding
the assumption of ￿sticky information.￿ Households and ￿rms are inattentive and
base their decisions on outdated information sets. This work is essentially incor-
porating ideas from behavioral economics into the NK model. This assumption
of sticky information is to some extent in the spirit of the expectational assump-
tions described above. Agents do not know the true model and therefore do not
form rational expectations. They have limited information. Contrary to the case in
the present model, however, in the Mankiw and Reis (2006) model, when agents
update, they do know everything. For example, if there is no sticky information,
the Mankiw and Reis model is just a standard classical ￿exible-price model. In
the model above, on the other hand, agents never know everything. But there are
similarities, and in general the above expectational assumptions are in the spirit
of the assumptions of behavioral economics in that there is a lot that agents don’t
8know.
ThemaindifferencessofarbetweenthetheoreticalworkbehindtheMCmodel
and that behind the NK model are that the MC work considers more decisions (is
more general), does not assume price stickiness, and does not assume rational
expectations. The lack of rational expectations leads to possible disequilibrium
since ￿rms may not set market clearing prices and wage rates. There can be
unintended inventory investment and unemployment (as de￿ned above).
Another major difference concerns estimation. The theoretical work behind
the MC model is used to guide the speci￿cation of a model to be estimated (the
MC model). Essentially, the theoretical work is used to guide the choice of left
hand side and right hand side variables. The empirical equations that are speci￿ed
are meant to be approximations to the decision equations of the households and
￿rms. The left hand side variables are the decision variables and the right hand
side variables are those that the agents take as given in the optimization process.
Moving from theoretical work to empirical speci￿cations is a messy business, and
extra theorizing is usually involved in this process, especially regarding lags and
assumptions about unobserved variables.
Although the estimated decision equations are only approximations, they do
not suffer from the Lucas (1976) critique if expectations are not rational. 4 More
speci￿cally, agents are assumed to form future expectations on the basis of past
values, where the parameters multiplying these values are constant. Expectations
are backward looking in this sense. The parameters in the expectation equations
4Evans and Ramey (2006) have shown that in some cases the Lucas critique is a problem even
if expectations are not rational. These cases are speci￿c to the Evans and Ramey framework, and
it is unclear how much they can be generalized.
9areassumednottodependontheparametersinthemodel: expectationsnotmodel
consistent (rational). In the speci￿cation of a decision equation to estimate, if
expected future values in￿uence the current decision (which is usually the case),
these values are substituted out by replacing them with the lagged values upon
which they are assumed to depend. The decision equation is then estimated with
these values included. If the parameters in the expectation equations are constant,
then this substitution does not introduce non constant parameters in the decision
equation. Itisusuallynotthecasethatonecanbackoutfromtheestimateddecision
equation the parameters of the expectations equations, but there is usually no need
todoso. Undertheaboveassumptions,expectationshavebeenproperlyaccounted
for in the decision equation.
Thistreatmentofexpectationsdoesnotmeanthatpolicychangeshavenoeffect
on behavior. Say that the Fed announces a new policy regime, one in which it is
going to weight in￿ation more than it has done in the past. If expectations are
rational, this announcement will immediately affect them and thus immediately
affect current decisions. Current decisions can be affected even before the Fed
has actually changed the interest rate. In the treatment here expectations and thus
decisions will be affected only after the interest rate has been changed. Decisions
respond to policy changes, but only in response to actual changes in the policy
variables. Announcements of new policy rules and the like have no effect on
decisions because agents don’t know the model and thus don’t use it to form
their expectations. If expectations were rational, the parameters would change
as regimes change, with the Lucas critique then being relevant. In the current
treatment the parameters of the estimated decision equations are constant across
10policy regimes, although the decisions obviously change as the policy variables
change.
The equations of the MC model are estimated by two-stage least squares, 5
and the model has been heavily tested. The latest test results are presented in
Fair (2004), and these results will not be discussed here. In general the model
does well in the tests. The current version of the MC model consists of 328
estimated equations, with 1,502 coef￿cients estimated, plus 1,220 estimated trade
share equations. None of the coef￿cients are chosen by calibration. There are
59 countries in the model, where for 21 countries only trade share equations are
estimated. In the United States part of the model there are 31 estimated equations
and about 100 identities. Many of the identities are needed to account for all the
￿ows of funds and balance sheet constraints. 6
To summarize, then, the parameters of the theoretical model that is behind the
MC model are never estimated, unlike the parameters of the NK model. In the
DSGE approach, the theoretical model is the one brought directly to the data, not
some approximation of it. If the NK model is well speci￿ed, the DSGE approach
has the advantage that deep parameters are being estimated. If, on the other hand,
the model is not well speci￿ed, the estimated model may be a poor approximation.
5Theestimationperiodsbeginin1954fortheUnitedStatesandassoonafter1960asdatapermit
for the other countries. They generally end between 2004 and 2006. The estimation accounts for
possible serial correlation of the error terms. The variables used for ￿rst stage regressors for a
country are the main predetermined variables in the model for the country.
6The latest description of the MC model is in Fair (2004). The model can be analyzed on line or
downloadedfromthewebsitelistedintheintroductoryfootnote. Thelistof￿rststageregressorsfor
each equation is also available from the website. Data sources and de￿nitions for all the variables
used in the next section are listed in Fair (2004) and on the website.
112.3 Critique of the Basic NK Model
The following critique pertains to the basic NK model in the literature. There
has been much work modifying and expanding the basic model, and some of the
following criticisms do not pertain to some versions of the model. It may be
that the following criticisms become moot as the basic NK model continues to be
improved. The main argument here is that at the present time NK models are not
likely to be good enough approximations of the economy to be trustworthy for
evaluating in￿ation targeting and that the MC model is a better choice.
ThereareanumberofreasonstothinkthatthebasicNKmodelisnotagoodap-
proximationoftheeconomy. First,thegovernmentandforeignsectorsareignored,
both of which are important parts of the macroeconomy. Second, the aggregate
demand equation seems much too simple. It does not take into account the differ-
ent determinants of consumption and investment demand (as well as of import and
export demand). In the MC model, for example, consumption is disaggregated
into services, nondurables, and durables, and investment is disaggregated into res-
idential, nonresidential ￿xed, and inventory. The estimated equations for these
six categories are quite different. For example, stock effects are different. The
initial stock of durable goods affects durable spending; the initial stock of housing
affects housing investment; the initial stock of capital affects nonresidential ￿xed
investment; and the initial stock of inventories affects inventory investment. Also,
there are important initial wealth effects (driven mostly by stock market ￿uctua-
tions)onconsumptionandhousinginvestment. Otherkeyexplanatoryvariablesin
the consumption and housing investment equations are after-tax real income and
12interest rates. There are thus many important variables are missing from the right
hand side of the NK aggregate demand equation. Third, the price equation of the
NK model ignores wages. 7 In the MC model prices affect wages and vice versa, 8
and this speci￿cation has been found to ￿t the data better than the speci￿cation of
a single price equation with no right hand side wage variable. 9
Regarding the use of the NK model to analyze monetary policy, one of its key
propertiesseemswrong. 10 IntheNKmodelapositivepriceshockwiththenominal
interest rate held constant is explosive (or in some cases indeterminate): in￿ation
increases from the price equation, demand increases from the aggregate demand
equation because the real interest rate falls, in￿ation increases more from the price
equation, and so on. In order for the model to be stable, the nominal interest rate
must be increased more than the rate of in￿ation, and so the coef￿cient on the
in￿ation rate in the nominal interest rate rule must be greater than one. In the
MC model, on the other hand, not only is a positive price shock with the nominal
interest rate held constant not explosive, it is in fact contractionary. First, real
wealth falls, which negatively affects consumption demand. Second, wages lag
prices (a property of the estimated price and wage equations) and so real income
falls, which also negatively affects consumption demand. Finally, the empirical
results suggest that except for nonresidential ￿xed investment, nominal interest
7A recent exception to leaving wages out of the model is Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005), where both staggered wage and price contracts are postulated.
8This result is compatible with the theoretical model outlined above in that initial values of other
￿rms’ prices and wages affects the ￿rm’s price and wage decisions.
9Also, the results in Fair (2000) suggest that the long run dynamics of NAIRU style equations,
like the New Keynesian Phillips curve, are not right given their focus on in￿ation rates rather than
price levels. For present purposes, however, the more important criticism of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve is that it ignores price and wage interactions.
10A more extensive discussion of the following points is in Fair (2002).
13rates matter rather than real interest rates, and so there is no positive effect on
demand from a lower real interest rate except for nonresidential ￿xed investment.
The net effect from a positive price shock with the nominal interest rate constant
is contractionary in the MC model. So not only does the Fed not have to raise the
nominal interest rate more than the in￿ation rate to prevent an explosive reaction,
it does not have to increase the nominal interest rate at all! If this property of the
MCmodelisinfactright,itsuggeststhattheNKmodelislikelytoleadamonetary
authority to overreact to an positive in￿ation shock since the contractionary effects
of the shock are not taken into account.
AnotherwayofevaluatingtheNKmodelistoseehowwellitexplainstheactual
data,inthiscasethedataonoutputandin￿ation. Ausefulprocedureforcomparing
models is to compute and compare outside-sample (i.e., outside the estimation
period) root mean squared errors (RMSEs). Ireland (2004b) computes outside
sample RMSEs for a RBC model; Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters
(2006) do the same for a NK model; and outside sample RMSEs are computed in
Fair (2004) for the United States part of the MC model. The prediction periods
used in these three cases are close enough to allow at least a rough comparison
across models to be made. The RMSEs are presented in Table 1.
The ￿US￿ model uses actual values of the exogenous variables, and the ￿US+￿
model uses forecasted values of the exogenous variables. Ireland considers two
versions of the RBC model, a ￿hybrid￿ version and a ￿diagonal￿ version. He does
not compute eight-quarter-ahead predictions, and the model does not include a
price variable. The prediction periods and table references are presented at the




Real GDP GDP De￿ator No. Obs.
Qtrs ahead Qtrs ahead Qtrs ahead
Model 4 8 4 8 4 8
1. US 1.02 1.46 0.78 1.39 76 72
2. US+ 1.33 1.84 0.87 1.52 76 72
3. Hybrid RBC 3.45 70
4. Diagonal RBC 2.16 70
5. NK 2.62 6.05 0.88 1.70 55 51
• Rows 1 and 2 rows from Fair (2004), Table 14.1, p. 166.
• Rows 3 and 4 from Ireland (2004b), Table 5, p. 1218.
• Row 5 computed from Del Negro et al. (2006),
Table 2, p. 36.
• Basic prediction periods: 1983.1￿2002.3 for rows 1 and 2;
1985.1￿2002.2 for rows 3 and 4; 1985.4￿2000.1 for row 5.
US+ models, 70 for the RBC models, and 55 for the NK model.
Table 1 shows that the NK model does poorly regarding real GDP. The four-
quarter-aheadRMSEisabouttwicealargeasthosefortheUSandUS+models,and
the eight-quarter-ahead RMSE is over three times as large. For the four-quarter-
ahead results, the NK model is better than the hybrid RBC model, but worse than
thediagonalRBCmodel. TheNKmodelismuchclosertotheUSandUS+models
for the GDP de￿ator. These results thus suggest that the NK aggregate demand
equation is not well speci￿ed, a point argued above. In light of these results the
quote from Woodford (2006) at the beginning of this section seems premature.
Another way of testing the NK model is to test the assumption of rational
expectations, which play a large role in the model. Although it is hard to test
15this assumption, results have generally not been supportive￿see, for example,
Fair (2004), Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004), and Rudd and Whelan (2006). The
results in Rudd and Whelan (2006) are particularly strong against the assumption
of rational expectations in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve. Given the results
to date, a useful working hypothesis would appear to be that expectations are not
rational rather than rational.
Returning to methodology, early examples of the estimation of equations that
are meant to approximate the decision rules of economic agents are Tinbergen
(1939) and Klein (1950). There is considerable economic theory involved in this
work,andinfactnearlyhalfofKlein’sbookisdevotedtointertemporaloptimizing
models of households and ￿rms. 11 But none of this early empirical work directly
estimated the parameters of the theoretical models. Theory was only used to
guide the choice of left hand side and right hand side variables. This approach
dominated macro model building through the 1960s. The Lucas (1976) critique
in the early 1970s changed the macro research landscape, and it eventually led to
the DSGE approach that is currently popular. Whether this was a positive change
for macro is an open question. Given the heterogeneity of agents, the complexity
of the actual decision making processes, the complexity of the interactions among
agents, and the quality of the macro data, it may be too much to expect that a
good approximation of the economy can be obtained by directly estimating the
parameters of a representative-agent theoretical model like that of the NK model.
It may be better to settle for estimated approximations to decision rules. And if
expectations are not rational, the Lucas critique is not likely to be a problem. The
11For an interesting discussion of this, see Solow (1991).
16basicNKmodeldoesnotappeartrustworthyforanalyzingmonetarypolicyissues,
including in￿ation targeting. Models more tied to the data are needed, and the
MC model is one alternative. It is used for the work in the next section. Table 2
summarizes the comparison of the basic NK and the MC model discussed in this
section.
3 Estimated Effects of In￿ation Targeting
3.1 Interest Rate Channels
It will ￿rst be useful to outline the various channels through which interest rates
affect output in the U.S. part of the MC model. Consider a decrease in the U.S.
short term interest rate, say a policy change by the Fed. This decreases long term
interest rates through estimated term structure equations. Interest rates appear as
explanatory variables in the consumption, residential investment, and nonresiden-
tial ￿xed investment equations, all with negative coef￿cient estimates. In addition,
decreases in interest rates have a positive effect on the change in stock prices
through an estimated capital gains and losses equation, which has a positive effect
on household wealth. This in turn has a positive effect on consumption because
wealth appears as an explanatory variable in the consumption equations. Also, a
decrease in U.S. interest rates (relative to other countries’ interest rates) leads to a
depreciation of the U.S. dollar through estimated exchange rate equations. 12
12A relative interest rate variable appears in the exchange rate equations for Canada, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and Germany (Euroland after 1999). (All exchange rate equations are relative to
the U.S. dollar.)
17Table 2
The Basic NK Model versus the MC Model
Property NK Model MC Model
Intertemporal optimization? Yes. Yes.
Rational expectations? Yes. No.
Imperfect competition? Yes. Yes.
Costly price adjustment? Yes. No.
Estimation. Parameters of the theoretical
model are calibrated or esti-
mated.
Thetheoreticalmodelisused
to guide the speci￿cation
of the econometric model,
which is then estimated. No
calibration for econometric
model.








Government sector? Usually not. Yes.
Foreign sector? Usually not. Yes.




Wealth effects? No. Yes, on the three categories
of consumption.
Wage equation? Usually not. Yes, separately estimated
wage and price equations.
Real versus nominal interest
rate effects.
Real effects imposed. Tested, where nominal inter-
est rates generally dominate.
Effects of a positive price
shock with the nominal inter-
est rate held constant.
Explosive or indeterminate. Contractionary.
Lucas critique a problem? No. Not under the assumptions
about expectations.
Long run tradeoff between
in￿ation and output?
No. Lack of tradeoff not tested
because of limited data; see
last paragraph in Section
3.2. Relationship likely to be
nonlinear.
Accuracy. See Table 1. See Table 1.
18Other things being equal, this depreciation is expansionary because U.S. exports
rise and U.S. imports fall. A decrease in interest rates thus has a positive effect on
aggregate demand through these channels. 13
3.2 The U.S. Price Equation
It will next be useful to outline the main price equation in the U.S. part of the
MC model. In this equation the log of the price level (the private nonfarm price
de￿ator) is regressed on a constant, the lagged logged price level, the log of the
wage rate, the log of the import price de￿ator, the unemployment rate, and the
time trend. The coef￿cient estimates are presented in Table 3. The cost variables
are the wage rate and the import price de￿ator, and the demand variable is the
unemployment rate. The time trend is added to pick up trend effects on the price
level not captured by the other variables. Adding the time trend to this equation is
like adding a constant term to an equation speci￿ed using the in￿ation rate rather
than the price level.
Thisequationdoeswellinvariouschi-squaredtests￿reportedinTableA10,p.
206, in Fair (2004), with updated results on the website. No signi￿cant improve-
ment in ￿t occurs when 1) the logged price level lagged twice, the log of the wage
rate lagged once, the log of the import price de￿ator lagged once, and the unem-
ployment rate lagged once are added as explanatory variables, 2) the equation is
estimated under the assumption of fourth order serial correlation of the error term,
13There is one effect that works in the opposite direction. An decrease in interest rates decreases
household interest income, which has a negative effect on household expenditures through a dis-
posable income variable in the household expenditure equations. This effect is, however, smaller
than the positive effects, and so the net effect of an interest rate decrease is positive.
19Table 3
U.S. Price Equation
LHS Variable is logPF






time trend 0.00032 9.88
SE 0.00343
• PF = private nonfarm price de￿ator.
• W = nominal wage rate adjusted
for labor productivity.
• PIM = import price de￿ator.
• UR = unemployment rate.
• Estimation period: 1954.1￿2006.1.
• Estimation method: 2SLS.
3) the log of the wage rate led once is added, 4) the log of the wage rate led four
timesisadded, 5)thelogofthewagerateledeighttimesisadded, and6)anoutput
gap variable is added. When the output gap variable is added, the unemployment
rate retains its signi￿cance, and so it dominates the output gap as an explanatory
variable.
If the wage rate variable were dropped from the equation in Table 3 and the
equation were speci￿ed as an in￿ation equation rather than a price-level equation,
the coef￿cient on logPF−1 would be one. In addition, if lagged in￿ation were
added as an explanatory variable to the in￿ation equation, this would introduce
logPF−2 with restrictions on the coef￿cients of both logPF−1 and logPF−2.
These restrictions were tested in Fair (2000) and updated to other countries in
20Chapter 4 in Fair (2004). They were rejected for the United States and generally
rejected for the other countries. They suggest that the price equation should be
speci￿ed in terms of price levels rather than in￿ation rates or changes in in￿ation
rates. Using changes in in￿ation rates is off by two derivatives!
ThewageequationintheU.S.partoftheMCmodelhas logW onthelefthand
side and on the right hand side: the constant, logW−1, logPF, logPF−1, and
the time trend. The price and wage equations are identi￿ed because logPIM and
UR are excluded from the wage equation, and logW−1 is excluded from the price
equation. Intheestimationofthewageequationalongrunrestrictionwasimposed
regardingtherealwage, whichisthatthederivedrealwageequationdoesnothave
on the right hand side the price level separately or the wage rate separately. This
restriction is not rejected by the data. The price and wage equations were tested
in Fair (2000) and (2004, Chapter 4) against standard NAIRU equations, and they
lead to considerably more accurate price level and in￿ation predictions. This is
consistent with the rejection of the NAIRU dynamics mentioned above.
A long run property of the price and wage equations is the following. If, say,
theunemploymentrateispermanentlydecreasedbyonepercentagepoint,theprice
levelispermanentlyhigher, butthein￿ationrateconvergesbacktoitsinitialvalue.
There is no permanent effect on the in￿ation rate. The evidence in favor of this
property is the lack of rejection of the restrictions discussed above.
Regarding this long run property, it is obviously not sensible to think that
the unemployment rate can be driven to zero with no permanent effect on the
in￿ation rate. The problem in my view with the speci￿cation in Table 3 (or with
speci￿cationsintermsofin￿ationratesorchangesinin￿ationrates)isthelinearity
21assumptionregardingtheeffectoftheunemploymentrateormeasuresoftheoutput
gap on the price level (or the in￿ation rate or the change in the in￿ation rate). At
low levels of the unemployment rate, this effect is likely to be nonlinear. I have
triedforboththeUnitedStatesandothercountriestopickupnonlineareffects, but
there appear to be too few times in which the unemployment rate is very low (or
the output gap very small) to allow sensible estimates to be obtained. This does
not mean, however, that the true functional form is linear, only that the data are
insuf￿cient for estimating the true functional form. What this means regarding the
MC model is that one should not run experiments in which unemployment rates
or output gaps are driven to historically low levels. Price-level or in￿ation-rate
equations are unlikely to be reliable in these cases. Because of this, an effort has
been made in the experiments below to stay around historical values.
3.3 The U.S. Interest Rate Rule
The ￿nal equation to discuss is the U.S. estimated interest rate rule. This rule
was ￿rst estimated and added to my U.S. model in 1978￿Fair (1978). This is the
￿rst instance that such as rule was added to a model, but the rules themselves go
back to Dewald and Johnson (1963). This was long before the rules came to be
called ￿Taylor rules;￿ they should really be called ￿Dewald-Johnson rules.￿ The
estimated rule is presented in Table 4.
The left hand side variable is the three-month Treasury bill rate ( RS), which
is taken as the control variable of the Fed. 14 The Fed is estimated to respond to
14Theactualcontrolvariableisthefederalfundsrate, butthisrateand RS aresohighlycorrelated
that it makes little difference which is used.
22Table 4
U.S. Interest Rate Rule
LHS Variable is RS
RHS Variable Coef. t-stat.
cnst 0.774 5.23
RS−1 0.922 53.30
˙ PD 0.071 4.18
UR -0.125 -4.22
∆UR -0.761 -6.02
˙ M1−1 0.012 2.30




Stability test, 1954.1-1979.3 versus 1982.4-2006.1:
Wald statistic is 15.33 (8 degrees of freedom,
p-value = .0531.)
• RS = three-month Treasury bill rate.
• PD = price de￿ator for domestic sales.
• UR = unemployment rate.
• M1 = money supply.
• D794823 = dummy variable that is 1 between
1979:4 and 1982:3 and 0 otherwise.
• A dot over a variable means percentage
change at an annual rate.
• Estimation period: 1954.1￿2006.1.
• Estimation method: 2SLS.
in￿ation,15 the unemployment rate, the change in the unemployment rate, and the
lagged growth of the money supply. The lagged values of RS are meant to soak
15NoteinTable4thattheFedistakentorespondtochangesin PD,thepricede￿atorfordomestic
sales, not PF, the private nonfarm price de￿ator. PD, contrary to PF, includes import prices
and excludes export prices. It is close in concept to the consumer price index. Better results are
obtained using PD rather than PF in the interest rate rule. The exact de￿nitions of PD and PF
are in Fair (2004) and on the website.
23up the dynamics, which are estimated to be fairly complicated. Between 1979:4
and 1982:3 (to be called the ￿early Volcker￿ period) the Fed, according to its
own announcements, operated under a procedure that focused more on monetary
aggregates than was the case before (or that was the case subsequently). This
behavioral change was handled in the speci￿cation by adding a variable that is the
lagged growth of the money supply multiplied by a dummy variable that is one
in the early Volcker period and zero otherwise. As can be seen in Table 4, the
coef￿cient estimate for the lagged money supply growth is about 20 times larger
in the early Volcker period than otherwise. This way of accounting for the Fed
policy shift does not, of course, capture the richness of the change in behavior, but
at least it seems to capture some of the change.
The equation in Table 4 does well in various chi-squared tests (reported in
Table A30, p. 216, in Fair (2004), with updated results on the website). No
signi￿cant improvement in ￿t occurs when 1) RS lagged four times, the in￿ation
ratelaggedonce,theunemploymentratelaggedtwice,andthepercentagegrowthin
the money supply lagged twice are added as explanatory variables, 2) the equation
isestimatedundertheassumptionoffourthorderserialcorrelationoftheerrorterm,
3) the in￿ation rate and the unemployment rate led once are added, 4) the in￿ation
rate and the unemployment rate led four times are added, 5) the in￿ation rate and
the unemployment rate led eight times are added, and 6) and 7) two measures of
expected future in￿ation are added.
The stability test listed at the bottom of Table 4 is of the hypothesis that the
coef￿cients of the rule are the same before the early Volcker period as after. Much
of the literature is of the view that the Fed behaved differently in the two periods,
24but the hypothesis of stability is not rejected at the 5 percent level: the p-value is
.0531. TheseresultsthussuggestthattheFedchangeditsbehavior(asitannounced
it did) in the early Volcker period, but then went back to its earlier behavior after
that.
The equation in Table 4 is taken in the experiments below as the rule that the
Fed has followed in the past. It will provide a basis of comparison for other rules
and procedures. Note that this rule is taken to be positive, not normative. It is the
rule the Fed is estimated to have followed (aside from the early Volcker years), not
a rule that is necessarily optimal.
3.4 Effects of a Decrease in RS in the MC Model
The period examined is 1994:1￿1998:4, 20 quarters, although, as discussed in
footnote 20, the results are not very sensitive to the use of different periods. The
￿rst experiment is simply to examine the effects of a change in RS in the model.
The estimated residuals from all the stochastic equations are ￿rst added to the
model and taken to be exogenous. This means that when the model is solved using
theactualvaluesofallexogenousvariables, aperfecttrackingsolutionisobtained.
The base path is thus just the historical path. 16 The interest rate rule in Table 4
is dropped from the model, and RS is decreased by one percentage point from
its historical value for each quarter. The model is then solved. The difference
between the predicted value of each variable and each period from this solution
16Regarding the above discussion of the price equation, this use of the estimated residuals is a
way of keeping the model close to the historical values and thus away from very low values of the
unemployment rate.
25and its base (actual) value is the estimated effect of the interest rate change.
SelectedresultsarepresentedinTable5. Thedecreasein RS ledtoanincrease
in output, a decrease in the unemployment rate, and an increase in in￿ation and the
pricelevel. ThedollardepreciatedrelativetotheJapaneseandGermanycurrencies
(as well as those of other countries) because of the relative interest rate effect in
the exchange rate equations. (RS fell relative to the interest rates of the other
countries.) This resulted in an increase in the U.S. price of imports ( PIM) and
U.S.realexports(EX). Theincreasein PIM hasapositiveeffecton PF (through
theequationinTable3),andtheincreasein EX hasapositiveeffectonoutput. PF
rises both from the increase in PIM and the decrease in the unemployment rate.
PD, the price de￿ator for domestic sales, rises slightly more than PF because
it is inclusive of import prices and PIM has risen because of the depreciation
of the dollar.17 As a rough rule of thumb, after two or three years the effect of
a one percentage point fall in RS is for output to be about .6 percent higher,
the unemployment rate about .3 percentage points lower, and in￿ation about .3
percentage points higher. The effects then diminish after that.




then increased by 0.005 (0.50 percentage points) from its estimated value. The
17PF is essentially the price de￿ator for domestic output. It is affected by PIM through the
equation in Table 3, but the goods relevant for PF are domestically produced goods only.
26Table 5
Effects of a Decrease in RS in the MC Model
Changes from Base Values
Quarters Ahead
Variable 1 4 8 12 16 20
RS -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
PD .05 .22 .53 .84 1.10 1.29
˙ PD .22 .24 .28 .26 .19 .13
PF .02 .14 .42 .72 .98 1.18
˙ PF .07 .20 .30 .29 .23 .16
Y .05 .36 .59 .63 .57 .49
UR -.01 -.13 -.26 -.29 -.26 -.20
EJA -.28 -.83 -1.23 -1.51 -1.74 -1.96
EGE -.44 -1.44 -2.33 -2.95 -3.51 -3.96
PIM .30 .63 1.09 1.45 1.80 2.05
EX .02 .13 .30 .50 .72 .94
• RS = three-month Treasury bill rate.
• PD = price de￿ator for domestic sales.
• PF = private nonfarm price de￿ator.
• Y = private real output.
• UR = unemployment rate.
• EJA = Japanese exchange rate relative to U.S. dollar;
a decrease is a depreciation of the dollar.
• EGE = German exchange rate relative to U.S. dollar;
a decrease is a depreciation of the dollar.
• PIM = U.S. import price de￿ator.
• EX = real value of U.S. exports.
• A dot over a variable means percentage change
at an annual rate.
• Simulation period: 1994.1￿1998.4.
modelwasthensolvedundervariousassumptionsaboutmonetarypolicy. Selected
results are presented in Table 6.
27Table 6
Effects of a Positive Price Shock
Changes from Base Values
Quarters Ahead
Variable 1 4 8 12 16 20 Sum
Case 1: RS Exogenous
PD .47 1.59 2.69 3.41 3.89 4.23
˙ PD 1.90 1.38 .90 .59 .37 .20
Y -.05 -.35 -.79 -1.19 -1.52 -1.77 -.98
UR .01 .12 .32 .51 .66 .74 .41
RS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 2: Estimated Rule
PD .46 1.55 2.58 3.27 3.77 4.20
˙ PD 1.87 1.32 .84 .57 .42 .29
Y -.05 -.43 -.92 -1.27 -1.49 -1.64 -1.01
UR .01 .14 .38 .56 .65 .68 .43
RS .12 .24 .15 -.02 -.19 -.32
Case 3: In￿ation Rule .2838
PD .43 1.39 2.05 2.30 2.40 2.54
˙ PD 1.75 1.10 .48 .20 .12 .09
Y -.07 -.71 -1.59 -2.12 -2.29 -2.31 -1.60
UR .02 .24 .67 .95 1.04 .98 .70
RS .50 1.35 1.56 1.36 1.10 .95
Case 4: In￿ation Rule .5676
PD .40 1.23 1.61 1.66 1.66 1.79
˙ PD 1.63 .89 .24 .05 .08 .11
Y -.10 -.99 -2.11 -2.56 -2.53 -2.40 -1.90
UR .02 .33 .90 1.18 1.17 1.01 .85
RS .93 2.35 2.37 1.79 1.37 1.27
Case 5: Price-level Rule
PD .45 1.50 2.17 2.08 1.47 .78
˙ PD 1.85 1.21 .41 -.21 -.56 -.64
Y -.05 -.51 -1.55 -2.71 -3.56 -3.90 -2.14
UR .01 .17 .61 1.17 1.61 1.74 .93
RS .11 .94 2.32 3.41 3.83 3.62
• Estimated Rule: equation in Table 4.
• In￿ation Rule .2838: equation in Table 4 with .2838 coef￿cient on ˙ PD
and zero coef￿cients on UR, ∆UR, ˙ M1−1, and D794823 · ˙ M1−1.
• In￿ation Rule .5676: equation in Table 4 with .5676 coef￿cient on ˙ PD
and zero coef￿cients on UR, ∆UR, ˙ M1−1, and D794823 · ˙ M1−1.
• Price-level Rule: equation in Table 4 with log(PD/PD∗)
replacing ˙ PD with a coef￿cient of 25 and zero coef￿cients
on UR, ∆UR, ˙ M1−1, and D794823 · ˙ M1−1, where PD∗ is the
target level of PD.
• Simulation period: 1994.1￿1998.4.
• For notation see notes to Table 5.
28Five cases are considered. For the ￿rst RS is exogenous (the interest rate rule
dropped). For the second the estimated interest rate rule in Table 4 is used. For the
third and fourth cases the coef￿cients on UR, ∆UR, ˙ M1−1, and D794823· ˙ M1−1
in the interest rate rule are taken to be zero and the coef￿cient on in￿ation, ˙ PD,
is increased. In the third case it is quadrupled to .2838, and in the fourth case it is
doubled from this value to .5676. The ￿fth case is like the third and fourth cases
except that the in￿ation variable is replaced by a price-level variable, the deviation
of PD from a target value, PD∗.18 A coef￿cient of 25 is used for this variable.
The number for output under the ￿Sum￿ column is the percentage cumulative loss
of output over the 20 quarters. The number for the unemployment rate under this
column is the average increase over the 20 quarters.
For all the experiments in this paper in which interest rate rules were used, RS
was never allowed to be less than 0.5. If a rule called for a smaller value than 0.5,
0.5 was used. For the optimal control experiments below, RS was constrained to
be 0.5 or larger by the speci￿cation of the loss function.
TheresultsinTable6arefairlyeasytoexplain. RememberfromSection2that
a positive price shock in the MC model is contractionary (and in￿ationary). The
Fed faces an unpleasant tradeoff. In case 1, where the Fed does nothing, the price
level (PD) is higher by 4.22 percent after 20 quarters and the cumulative output
loss is 0.98 percent. In case 2, where the Fed behaves according to the estimated
rule, it is interesting that the Fed does very little. RS does not change much; the
price level is higher by 4.19 percent after 20 quarters; and the cumulative output
18Because the base path is just the historical path (because of the use of the estimated residuals),
the target value of PD for each quarter is just its historical value.
29loss is 1.01 percent. If the estimated rule has adequately captured historic Fed
behavior, it says that the Fed responds to a bad price shock by not changing the
interest rate much and thus accepting some increase in in￿ation and the price level
and some loss of output.
Cases 3 and 4 show the tradeoff from using a rule that weights only in￿ation.
In both cases the interest rate is increased substantially. In case 3 the price level is
downto2.54percenthigherafter20quartersandthecumulativeoutputlossis1.60
percent. In case 4 the price level is down further to 1.80 percent higher after 20
quarters and the cumulative output loss is 1.90 percent. In￿ation obviously comes
down much faster in cases 3 and 4 than in cases 1 and 2.
Case 5, which uses the price-level rule, has a much higher interest rate at the
end and much lower output. At the end of the 20 quarters the price level is down
to an increase of only .78 percent, but the decrease in output is 3.90 percent and
the increase in the unemployment rate is 1.74 percentage points. The increase in
RS is 3.62 percentage points. The price-level rule also has the feature of getting
started slowly relative to the rules that use the in￿ation rate. This re￿ects the fact
that the price shock leads to an immediate large change in the in￿ation rate but a
more slowly increasing price level. In general the price-level rule would appear to
be dominated by the in￿ation rules regarding responses to price shocks.
The third experiment examines the effects of a positive demand shock. For
this experiment the constant terms in two of the U.S. consumption equations were
increased. Otherwise, the same procedures were followed for this experiment as
were followed for the second one. Selected results are presented in Table 7.
30Table 7
Effects of a Positive Demand Shock
Changes from Base Values
Quarters Ahead
Variable 1 4 8 12 16 20 Sum
Case 1: RS Exogenous
PD .03 .25 .72 1.17 1.50 1.67
˙ PD .13 .38 .46 .39 .23 .10
Y .30 1.25 1.78 1.76 1.56 1.37 1.41
UR -.06 -.44 -.74 -.73 -.59 -.42 -.56
RS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Case 2: Estimated Rule
PD .02 .21 .51 .72 .84 .87
˙ PD .10 .30 .29 .19 .07 .01
Y .29 1.17 1.49 1.33 1.13 1.02 1.12
UR -.06 -.42 -.63 -.54 -.39 -.27 -.43
RS .06 .46 .73 .75 .67 .56
Case 3: In￿ation Rule .2838
PD .03 .23 .59 .86 1.01 1.04
˙ PD .11 .34 .34 .23 .08 .01
Y .30 1.21 1.59 1.44 1.20 1.06 1.19
UR -.06 -.43 -.67 -.59 -.43 -.28 -.46
RS .03 .25 .52 .63 .58 .46
Case 4: In￿ation Rule .5676
PD .03 .21 .49 .67 .73 .73
˙ PD .10 .30 .26 .15 .03 -.01
Y .29 1.17 1.46 1.25 1.03 .95 1.07
UR -.06 -.42 -.62 -.51 -.34 -.24 -.41
RS .06 .45 .85 .94 .80 .59
Case 5: Price-level Rule
PD .03 .24 .63 .87 .83 .58
˙ PD .12 .36 .36 .16 -.11 -.27
Y .30 1.24 1.65 1.38 .91 .53 1.07
UR -.06 -.44 -.70 -.58 -.31 -.06 -.42
RS .01 .13 .53 1.05 1.46 1.61
• Simulation period is 1994.1￿1998.4.
• For notation see notes to Table 5.
For this experiment the estimated rule and the in￿ation rules respond
similarly￿cases 2, 3, and 4. The interest rate is increased, which lowers both
31output and the price level relative to case 1 of no interest rate change. Comparing
the estimated rule to say, in￿ation rule .2858, the differences are small, and one
could conclude that moving from current Fed behavior to behavior in which only
in￿ation is in the rule makes little difference. This, of course, is not true for the
price shock in Table 6, and so the consequences of changing rules depends on
the type of shock. Regarding case 5, the price-level rule, there is a slower initial
response and then larger effects at the end.
3.6 Stochastic Simulation Results
The shocks in Tables 6 and 7 are just made up shocks. A more general way of ex-
amining the consequences of using different interest rate rules is to use historically
estimated residuals and stochastic simulation. There are 328 stochastic equations
in the MC model, 182 quarterly and 146 annual. There is an estimated error term
for each of these equations for each period. Although the equations do not all
have the same estimation period, the period 1977￿2004 is common to all equa-
tions. There are thus available 28 vectors of annual error terms and 112 vectors
of quarterly error terms. These vectors are taken as estimates of the economic
shocks, and they are drawn in the manner discussed below. Since these vectors are
vectors of the historical shocks, they pick up the historical correlations of the error
terms. If, for example, shocks in two consumption equations are highly positively




for all the stochastic simulations the estimated residuals are added to the model
and the draws are around these residuals. Each trial for the stochastic simulation
is a dynamic deterministic simulation for 1994:1￿1998:4 using a particular draw
of the error terms. For each of the ￿ve years for a given trial an integer is drawn
between 1 and 28 with probability 1/28 for each integer. This draw determines
whichofthe28vectorsofannualerrortermsisusedforthatyear. Thefourvectors
of quarterly error terms used are the four that correspond to that year. Each trial is
thus based on drawing ￿ve integers. The solution of the model for this trial is an
estimateofwhattheworldeconomywouldhavebeenlikehadtheparticulardrawn
error terms actually occurred. (Remember that the drawn error terms are on top of
the historical residuals for 1994:1￿1998:4, which are always used.) The number
of trials taken is 1000, so 1000 world economic outcomes for 1994:1￿1998:4 are
available for analysis.
The historical residuals are added to whatever interest rate rule is used, but no
errors are drawn for it. Adding the historical residuals means that when the model
inclusive of the rule is solved with no errors for any equation drawn, a perfect
tracking solution results. 19 Not drawing errors for the rule means that the Fed does
not behave randomly but simply follows the rule.
Let y
j
t be the predicted value of endogenous variable y for quarter t on trial j,
and let y∗
t be the base (actual) value. How best to summarize the 1000×20 values
of y
j




values from the rules differ.
33around y∗





t)2, where J is the total number of trials. 7
The problem with this measure, however, is that there are 20 values per variable,






















L is a measure of the deviation of the variable from its base values over the whole
period. It is not an estimated variance, just a summary measure of variability.
Selected results are presented in the ￿rst ￿ve rows in Table 8: values of L are
presented for ￿ve variables. Comparing rows 1 and 2, the estimated rule does a
fairly good job in lowering the values of L. L for PD falls from 4.69 to 3.08, and
L for Y falls from 2.88 to 2.22. L increases for RS from zero to .97.20 In row 3
in￿ation rule .2838 lowers L for PD more (to 2.53) at a cost of higher values of L
for Y (2.55) and RS (1.59) compared to the estimated rule. The results in rows 2
and 3, for the estimated rule and in￿ation rule .2858, are not as similar as they are
for the demand shock in Table 7, but they are more similar than for the price shock
in Table 6. This is as expected since the errors used for the stochastic-simulation
20Whentheexperimentinrow2isdoneforthe2000:1￿2004:4period(insteadof1994:1￿1998:4),
the values of L are: 3.86 for PD, 2.90 for ˙ PD, 2.08 for Y , .58 for UR, and .64 for RS. In this
later period the actual values of RS are on average smaller, and in the experiment there are more
times when the 0.5 constraint for the minimum value of RS is binding. This is the main reason
that L for RS is lower in the later period: the Fed has less room to maneuver. (Remember that the
base path for an experiment is just the historical path.) This constraint results in somewhat higher
values of L for PD and ˙ PD in the later period, but in general the results are fairly close.
34Table 8
Variability Estimates: Values of L
MC Model
PD ˙ PD Y UR RS
1. No rule (RS exogenous) 4.69 2.85 2.88 .80 0
2. Estimated rule 3.08 2.45 2.22 .59 .97
3. In￿ation Rule .2838 2.53 2.33 2.55 .67 1.59
4. In￿ation Rule .5676 1.63 2.03 2.56 .63 4.04
5. Price-level Rule 2.60 2.83 3.21 .78 3.61
US(EX,PIM) Model
6. No rule (RS exogenous) 4.48 2.58 3.29 .97 0
7. Estimated rule 3.66 2.44 2.50 .72 .87
8. Optimal (λ1 = 1.5,λ2 = 1.5) 3.72 2.40 2.46 .72 .98
9. Optimal (λ1 = 0.0,λ2 = 3.0) 3.04 2.25 2.97 .86 .99
10. Optimal (λ1 = 0.0,λ2 = 1.0)a 2.29 2.64 4.32 1.15 3.33
aPrice-level loss function; see text
• Simulation period: 1994:1￿1998:4.
• See notes to Tables 5 and 6.
draws consist of both demand and price shocks. The draws are, of course, more
representative of actual shocks than are the shocks used in Tables 6 and 7.
The second in￿ation rule is more extreme than the ￿rst (row 4 versus row 3).
L for PD falls to 1.63, but L for RS is now 4.04. It is interesting in this case
that the cost of lowering L for PD is added variability of RS, not of Y and UR.
Other things being equal, lowering the variability of PD in the MC model lowers
the variability of Y , and this affect dampens the effects that work in the opposite
direction, which arise from the higher variability of RS.
Again, the price-level rule (row 5) is not very good. Comparing rows 3 and 5,
the price level rule has about the same value of L for PD, but much larger values
35for Y and RS.
3.7 Optimal Control Results
Optimal control techniques are the obvious ones to use in evaluating in￿ation
targeting, and so the most weight should probably be placed on the following
results. Theoptimalcontrolmethodologyrequiresthatalossfunctionbepostulated
for the Fed. Assume that the loss for quarter t is:
Ht = λ1(URt − UR∗
t)2 + λ2( ˙ PDt − ˙ PD
∗
t)2 + 9.0(∆RSt − ∆RS∗
t)2
+1.0/(RSt − 0.499) + 1.0/(16.001 − RSt)
(3)
where ∗ denotes a base value. λ1 is the weight on unemployment deviations, and
λ2 is the weight on in￿ation deviations. The last two terms in (3) insure that the
optimal values of RS will be between 0.5 and 16.0. The middle term penalizes
changes in RS; more will be said about it below. As was done for the other
experiments, the estimated residuals are ￿rst added to the stochastic equations and
taken to be exogenous. The base path is then the historical path, and the target
values in (3) are the historical values.
Assume that the control period of interest is 1 through T, where in the present
case 1 is 1994:1 and T is 1998:4. Although this is the control period of interest,
in order not to have to assume that life ends in T, the control problem should be
thoughtofasoneofminimizingtheexpectedvalueof
∑T+n
t=1 Ht, where nischosen
to be large enough to avoid unusual end-of-horizon effects near T. The overall
control problem should thus be thought of as choosing values of RS that minimize
the expected value of
∑T+n
t=1 Ht subject to the model used.
36If the model used is linear and the loss function quadratic, it is possible to de-
rive analytically optimal feedback equations for the control variables. In general,
however, optimal feedback equations cannot be derived for nonlinear models or
for loss functions with nonlinear constraints on the instruments, and a numerical
procedure must be used. The following procedure was used for the present re-
sults. It is based on a sequence of solutions of deterministic control problems, one
sequence per trial.
Recallwhatatrialforthestochasticsimulationis. Atrialisasetofdrawsof20
vectors of error terms, one vector per quarter. Given this set, the model is solved
dynamically for the 20 quarters using an interest rate rule (or no rule). This entire
procedure is then repeated the chosen number of trials, at which time the summary
statisticsarecomputed. Aswillnowbediscussed,eachtrialfortheoptimalcontrol
procedure requires that 20 deterministic control problems be solved.
For purposes of solving the control problems, the Fed is assumed to know
the model (its structure and coef￿cient estimates) and the exogenous variables,
both past and future. The Fed is assumed not to know the future values of any
endogenous variable or any error draw when solving the control problems. The
Fed is assumed to know the error draws for the ￿rst quarter for each solution. This
is consistent with the use of the above rules, where the error draws for the quarter
are used when solving the model with the rule.
The procedure for solving the overall control problem is as follows.
1. Draw a vector of errors for quarter 1, and add these errors to the equa-
tions. Take the errors for quarters 2 through k to be their historical values
(no draws), where k is de￿ned shortly. Choose values of RS for quarters
1 through k that minimize
∑k
t=1 Ht subject to the model as just described.
37Thisisjustadeterministicoptimalcontrolproblem,whichcanbesolved,for
example, bythemethodinFair(1974b). 21 Let RS∗
1 denotetheoptimalvalue
of RS for quarter 1 that results from this solution. The value of k should be
chosen to be large enough so that making it larger has a negligible effect on
RS∗
1. (This value can be chosen ahead of time by experimentation.) RS∗
1 is
a value that the Fed could have computed at the beginning of quarter 1 (as-
suming the model and exogenous variables were known) having knowledge
of the error draws for quarter 1, but not for future quarters.
2. Record the solution values from the model for quarter 1 using RS∗
1 and the
error draws. These solution values are what the model estimates would have
occurred in quarter 1 had the Fed chosen RS∗
1 and had the error terms been
as drawn.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for the control problem beginning in quarter 2, then for
the control problem beginning in quarter 3, and so on through the control
problem beginning in quarter T. For an arbitrary beginning quarter s, use
the solution values of all endogenous variables for quarters s − 1 and back,
as well as the values of RS∗
s−1 and back.
4. Steps 1 through 3 constitute one trial, i.e., one set of T drawn vectors of
errors. Do these steps again for another set of T drawn vectors. Keep doing
this until the speci￿ed number of trials has been completed.
The solution values of the endogenous variables carried along for a given trial
from quarter to quarter in the above procedure are estimates of what the economy
would have been like had the Fed chosen RS∗
1,...,RS∗
T and the error terms been as
drawn.
The optimal control procedure is too costly in terms of computer time to be
able to be used for the MC model, and for this work the U.S. subset of the model
was used, denoted US(EX,PIM). This model is exactly the same as the model
for the United States in the MC model except for the treatment of U.S. exports
21This method sets up the problem as an unconstrained nonlinear optimization problem and uses
an optimization algorithm like DFP to ￿nd the optimum.
38(EX) and the U.S. price of imports (PIM). These two variables change when
RS changes￿primarily because the value of the dollar changes￿and the effects
of RS on EX and PIM were approximated in the following way.
First, logEXt−α1RSt was regressed on a constant, t, logEXt−1, logEXt−2,
logEXt−3, and logEXt−4, and logPIMt − α2RSt was regressed on a constant,
t, logPIMt−1, logPIMt−2, logPIMt−3, and logPIMt−4. Second, these two
equations were added to the US(EX,PIM) model for particular values of α1 and
α2, and an experiment was run in which the estimated interest rate rule of the Fed
was dropped and RS was decreased by one percentage point. This was done many
times for different values of α1 and α2. The ￿nal values of α1 and α2 chosen were
ones whose experimental results most closely matched the results for the same
experiment using the complete MC model. The ￿nal values chosen were -.0004
and -.0007 respectively. Third, the experiment in row 2 of Table 8 was run for
the US(EX,PIM) model (with the EX and PIM equations added) and with the
estimated errors from the EX and PIM equations being used in the drawing of
the errors. When an error for the EX equation was drawn, it was multiplied by
β1, and when an error for the PIM equation was drawn, it was multiplied by β2.
The experiment was run many times for different values of β1 and β2, and the ￿nal
values chosen were ones that led to results similar to those in the row 2 of Table 8.
The values were β1 = .4 and β2 = .75. The results using these values are in
row 7 of Table 8. The chosen values of α1, α2, β1, and β2 were then used for the
experiments in rows 8￿10.
Because of computational costs, 100 rather than 1000 trials were used for the
optimal control experiments. The results are presented in rows 6-10 in Table 8.
39Eachexperimentinarowusesthesamesetsoferrordraws,whichlessensstochastic
simulationerroracrossexperiments,althoughthesesetsoferrordrawsaredifferent
from those used for the experiments in rows 1￿5. Rows 6 and 7 are equivalent
to rows 1 and 2: no rule and the estimated rule, respectively. Comparing these
rows, the same pattern holds for both the overall MC model and the US(EX,PIM)
model, namely that the estimated rule substantially lowers the variability of both
PD and Y .
Row 8 uses equal weights on unemployment and in￿ation in the loss function.
The values of λ1 and λ2 of 1.5 were chosen after some experimentation￿using
the coef￿cient of 9 on the middle term in equation (3)￿to have the value of L
for RS to be similar to its value when the estimated rule is used. The value of
L is .98, which is close to .87 for the estimated rule. The aim is to constrain the
optimal control procedure from variations in RS much different from what the
Fed is estimated to have done historically (aside from the early Volcker period).
The results using the estimated rule in row 7 and the equally-weighted optimal
control procedure in row 8 are quite similar. In other words, the estimated rule is
consistent with the Fed solving an optimal control problem with equal weights on
unemployment and in￿ation.
Row 9 uses a zero weight on unemployment and a weight of 3.0 on in￿ation.
Again, the weight of 3.0 led the value of L for RS (.99) being close to the value
using the estimated rule. Comparing row 9 to row 7, L for PD has fallen from
3.66 to 3.04 at a cost of L rising for Y from 2.50 to 2.97. For the in￿ation rate
( ˙ PD) L falls from 2.44 to 2.25, and for the unemployment rate L rises from .72 to
.86.







where PD∗ is the target (historical) value. The results in row 10 are not as good as
those in row 9. The value of L for PD is lower, but all the other values are larger.
These poor results are consistent with the poor results in row 5 in Table 8 and in
case 5 in Tables 6 and 7.
4 Conclusion
One obvious conclusion from the results in Section 3 is that price-level targeting
is not a good idea. This is contrary to the conclusion of Cecchetti and Kim (2005),
who argue that price-level targeting is less risky than in￿ation targeting. This
conclusion is thus obviously model dependent. Cecchetti and Kim use a very
simple model, and their conclusion is obviously not robust to the use of a model
like the MC model.
Anotherconclusionisthatthereisclearlysomeoutputcosttoin￿ationtargeting.
In terms of variability, rows 8 and 9 in Table 8 show that lowering the variability
of the price level by 18 percent (from 3.72 to 3.04) results in an increase in the
variability of output of 21 percent (from 2.46 to 2.97). The variability of the
unemployment rate increases by 19 percent (from .72 to .86).
Tables 6 and 7 show that price shocks make more of a difference than demand
shocks in terms of the output costs of in￿ation targeting. For the price shock in
Table6thein￿ationtargetingrulewithaweightof.2838comparedtotheestimated
41rule lowered the increase in the price level by 40 percent after 20 quarters (from
4.20 to 2.54) and increased the cumulative output loss from 1.01 percent to 1.60
percent. For the demand shock in Table 7, on the other hand, the results for these
two rules are very similar.
Regarding the estimated rule in Table 4, rows 7 and 8 in Table 8 show that
the rule is consistent with the Fed weighting unemployment and in￿ation equally.
Rows 7 and 9 show that the rule is not consistent with weighting only in￿ation.
The results using the estimated rule in Tables 6, 7, and 8 show that the rule does
a fairly good job in responding to shocks in that the variability of both the price
level and output is substantially lowered relative to the case of no rule. And in
Table 6 it is interesting that when there is a bad price shock, where the price level
increasesandoutputfalls, theestimatedrulesuggeststhattheFedessentiallysplits
the difference and does nothing. This, of course, is not the case under the in￿ation
targeting rules.
Finally, given that the results in Table 8 are based on historical shocks, it is
clear that whatever policy the Fed follows, considerable variability is left. The
Fed’s power is limited. This is clear from the results in Table 5, where the effects
of a change in RS on the price level and output are moderate.
Overall, the results in Section 3 suggest that the Fed should continue to behave
as it has in the past.
Onecaveatregardingthepresentresultsconcernsthepriceandwageequations
intheMCmodel. Rememberthatbyaddingtheestimatedresidualstothestochastic
equations and thus taking the base path to be the historical path, the MC model has
in effect been steered away from very low values of the unemployment rate. The
42assumption in the price equation in Table 3 the unemployment rate has a linear
effectonthepricelevelisnotlikelytoholdatverylowvaluesoftheunemployment
rate. Thus the above conclusions about tradeoffs between price level or in￿ation
variability and output variability are not likely to pertain to cases of very low
unemployment rates.
Another caveat concerns the treatment of expectations in the MC model. Say
that at the beginning of some quarter the Fed announced that it was switching
to in￿ation targeting. This announcement would have no immediate effects in
the MC model. The effects come when the Fed actually changes interest rates.
For example, if this new policy led the Fed to raise interest rates sharply in the
current quarter and the next few quarters, this would have large effects in the
MC model in the current and future quarters as the higher interest rates came
about. But there is no change from the announcement alone and no change in the
parameters of the estimated decision equations. Agents don’t know the model,
including the rule of the Fed, and they make their decisions based in effect on
adaptiveexpectations. AsdiscussedinSection2.3,testsoftherationalexpectations
hypothesis have generally not been supportive, and it may be that the assumption
of adaptive expectations is a reasonable approximation of how expectations are
actuallyformed. Thekeyquestionforpurposesofthispaperiswhethertheadaptive
expectations assumption is a good approximation if the Fed explicitly announces
a policy change￿a new rule. It is hard to test this because there have been so
few announced rule changes. The results in this paper are thus based on the
assumption that agents react to policy-variable changes as they take place but
not to pure announcements. If research on NK models, which are based on the
43assumption of rational expectataions, progresses to the point where the models are
good approximations of the economy, it will be interesting to see if the present
results are substantially changed.
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